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The efforts that have been put forth to have the sentence for
murder disaffirmed which was pronounced upon Buchanan in the
New York courts more than two years ago, do not seem to have
been well directed in the case brought before the U. S. Supreme
Court (In re Buchanan, i U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 723). An appli-
cation for a writ of error to the Court of Appeals failed to disclose
any ground whatever to justify the granting of such a writ, the
question presented being purely one of fact. The petitioner
endeavored to raise a constitutional point by asserting that the
trial and conviction had been "without due process of law" in that
the jury which rendered the verdict were not twelve men of sound
mind and memory as contemplated in the Constitution. But it
appeared from the record that the only objection to the jury was
based on the alleged mental and physical incapacity of one juror
who was taken ill while in the jury room. A motion for a new
trial having been made in consequence, it was sufficiently made
out upon proof, that the illness was temporary, and had in no way
prejudiced the accused, having occurred after a decision of
Iguilty" had been reached, the separation for medical attendance
being involuntary, the recovery sufficient for the juror to confer
about the case and render a verdict with the others. The denial
of the motion was the exercise of judicial discretion as to the com-
petency of the juror to return the verdict, the opinions in support
of the motion being premised on statements given them, the
opposing testimony based on personal examination. The denial
of the motion appeared perfectly satisfactory and the judgment
was one of fact which the court cannot review. No right, privi-
lege or immunity under the Constitution was specially asserted,
and the whole claim fell far short of a federal question.
Is there a common law of the United States? This question is
ably argued in the opinion delivered in the case of Sw7,ift v. Phila-
de phia &- _R. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 59. Action had been brought
to recover back freight exacted in'excess of a reasonable rate,
prior to the operation of schedules provided by the Interstate
Commerce Act, and the conclusions reached by the court are sum-
marized as follows:." The right to recover from common carriers
for unreasonable exactions must be found in some positive law of
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the land applicable to the case in hand. Such a prohibition is in
fact found in the common law; but it is not applicable to the case
in hand unless there be a common law of the United States as a
distinct sovereignty, because the regulation of the rates upon
which the suit is dependent is within the scope of interstate com-
merce and an exclusively national affair. Following its former
opinion, delivered' in Swift v. R. R. Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 858, the
court held that the United States has no common law of its own,
and pointed out the anomalies that must follow such an assump-
tion; for it would at once result in "two separate systems of law
over the same subject matter and the same territory," one the
law of the State, the other the "common law" of the nation.
Inasmuch as the latter would necessarily cover almost the entire
field of State legislation, the doctrines of dual sovereignty and
concurrent jurisdiction become as impossible as they are illogical.
Article 6 of the Constitution was also cited as definingthe supreme
law of the land to consist "in the constitution and such laws and
treaties" as should be made in pursuance thereof, without any
reference to the common law of England. In opposition to the
view as given above, it has been urged that the Supreme Court
has always recognized the existence of "general" or "common"
law, and the case of Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, is cited,
in deciding which Justice Brewer said it depended upon no statute
nor local usage or custom, but "upon those considerations of right
and justice which have been gathered into the great body of the
rules and principles known as the common law." In referring to
this decision the court very clearly demonstrated that the Supreme
Court was there defining State common law; in other words, that
when the decision of the highest tribunal of a State is overturned,
we are not to suppose an introduction of new law, but a better
interpretation of existing law, which, in the Ohio case cited, was
the common law of that State.
The difficulty of finally settling questions of railroad transpor-
tation by legislative enactment is made apparent by the frequent
cases involving a construction of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The decision in the case of Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co.,
63 Fed. Rep. 903, gives an interpretation of the "long and short-
haul" clause in the eventwhere two connecting carriers unite in
putting in force a joint rate between given points. The plaintiff
instituted an action for damages, because the defendant company,
as he alleged, had charged him more for freighting corn from
Carroll, Iowa, to Chicago, than they were charging for a greater
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distance, viz.: from Blair, Neb., to Chicago by way of Rochelle,
Ill., the terminus of the route. It appears from the evidence that
the lower rate only applied to through shipments via Rochelle to
New York and other eastern seaboard cities, the defendant com-
pany having established a "joint rate" in common with carriers
who took the grain on from Rochelle. The court upheld the
ruling of the trial court that a local rate between points on the
same road is not necessarily unlawful because it is higher than the
rate charged under a joint tariff established by connecting carriers
for a much longer distance. Where two connecting carriers thus
unite, "they form practically a new line whose rate is not the
standard by which to determine the reasonableness of local tariffs
on either line," and Railway Co. v. Osborne, io U. S. App. 430, was
extensively cited to prove that "undue preference to a person or
locality" does not follow in law because there is a disparity be-
tween a local and a joint rate.
